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1. During the 24th Plenary Session of the SED Central Committee it became known that Alfred Neumann of the SED Politbüro had been forbidden to speak at the session. This had a rather depressing effect because Neumann's prestige had increased in connection with his successful operation against the rally of the so-called "Baeren-Division" in West Berlin. Discontent with the attitude of the SED leadership toward the new Soviet-German policy was also reflected in the final vote of the conference, which was taken with 34 abstentions. At the conclusion of the meeting, Wilhelm Pieck stressed the necessity for unity, which alone could achieve the victory of the national cause.
2. In private discussions during pauses in the negotiations, the result of the Warsaw conference was criticized. It was pointed out that this conference had revealed the provisional status of the GDR and the fact that the Soviet-German policy was based on opportunistic consideration of the GDR as a pawn within the framework of the German question, exclusively dominated by the interests of the Soviet Union and any SED leaders. Many of the SED leaders would bring about a deep crisis in the German labor generally.
3. The 23 speakers who took part in discussions during the 24th Plenary Session of the SED Central Committee had been carefully selected and screened by Albert Norden, who saw to it that awkward questions were not raised. The ten-point program for the reunification of Germany as put forth by Ulbricht at Pushkin's suggestion had been discussed with representatives of the SED prior to the plenary session of the Central Committee. Ulbricht's suggestion was obviously incorrect. He was ready to resume discussions. He learned that Tito had refused to resume diplomatic relations with the GDR, but he still held the conviction that Austria would soon recognize the GDR.

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